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with no philosophical training. Against Marriage is surely going to compel 
its readers to think deeply whether the institution of marriage is still viable 
and about how the regulation of adult personal relationships may have to 
be altered to meet the demands of justice.
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While not intended as an academic treatise on religion, Tim Crane’s The 
Meaning of Belief is a thoughtful, interesting refl ection on the nature of 
religious belief in contemporary life. The book is clearly and fl uidly written, 
as one would expect from Crane, and its main theme will be refreshing to 
those who are weary of the cliché-ridden debates between the New Atheists 
and their theistic interlocutors. Crane’s central thesis is that many of his 
fellow atheists incorrectly identify religion with a mere set of cosmological 
and moral propositions, falsely leading them to believe that religious people 
will tend to change their minds after exposure to the right philosophical or 
scientifi c arguments. The book is very rich, and it would be impossible to 
name all its virtues without resorting to a laundry list; I recommend the 
title for its expansiveness alone. However, I found Crane’s overall argument 
unconvincing.
Crane asks, “What is religion, and how does it move people?” and accu-
rately responds that a strict, universal defi nition of religion is probably im-
possible (2–4). He endorses Durkheim's claim that religions are best under-
stood by following how they developed historically, and then provides his own 
defi nition of religion: “Religion, as I am using the word, is a systematic and 
practical attempt by human beings to fi nd meaning in the world and their 
place in it, in terms of their relationship to something transcendent” (6). He 
elaborates upon these points in the next two chapters in terms of “the reli-
gious impulse” and the phenomenon of “identifi cation.”
One puzzling aspect of this fi rst chapter is Crane’s insistence upon the 
theoretical and practical value of his own defi nition of religion, despite his 
admission that religion probably does not have an exhaustive or universal 
essence. He seems to vacillate between a hard realism, which (apparently) 
prevents one from calling “socialism, communism, environmentalism, sci-
entism, humanism, secularism, and atheism” religions (“[W]hat would be 
the point of this?” Crane asks (24)) and a softer anti-essentialism which 
allows that there is likely no single essence of religion. Crane recognizes 
that religion is a historically-conditioned category that may not have been 
used as a concept through much of history; in the end, however, he clearly 
settles into a realist mode. I wish he had better explained and justifi ed this 
move. Why is it best to act as if that there is some real phenomenon which 
lies behind the bundle of characteristics (‘systematicity, practicality, mean-
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ing-seeking, relatedness to the transcendent’) which are supposedly con-
catenated in ‘religion’, given that these characteristics can be isolated and 
found in combination with other things (as Crane acknowledges)? I do not 
believe that Crane successfully captures the phenomenon (if there is one), 
and this is presuming that the individual items in the ‘religious’ bundle 
(e.g. ‘transcendence’) are well-defi ned categories themselves, which I do not 
think Crane proves. I think that the book also overlooks motives which both 
secularists and religious people might have for wishing to do away with the 
category of religion at a political level. On the secular front, some might 
point out that religious organizations are often given special protections 
and privileges simply because they are ‘religious,’ and some might see this 
as unjustifi ed. Similarly, religious people might note that ‘religious’ argu-
ments are seldom taken seriously in public discourse and might inquire as 
why these arguments deserve no consideration simply because (if Crane 
is correct) religion appeals to a normative transcendent order or involves 
group identity. Crane does not closely address such  political considerations, 
which is unfortunate given their relevance to his overall message.
Other interesting discussions in the chapter concern the nature of the 
supernatural (Crane does not believe that this category is helpful in distin-
guishing religion from non-religion, since the category is based on contest-
able, modern assumptions about nature, and would not distinguish reli-
gion from magic (10)); the features of belief (“accessibility to consciousness, 
connection to action, and the aim toward truth” (16)); and the differences 
among atheism, agnosticism, and humanism. Crane’s points on these topics 
are never groundbreaking, but they are clear and plausible. Crane’s novel 
thesis—that the New Atheists miss the point of religion—is less plausible; 
I shall return to this later.
The next chapter discusses an element of religion which apparently dif-
ferentiates it from other belief-systems: relatedness-to-transcendence or 
“the religious impulse.” Crane cites James, explaining that the religious 
impulse is the tendency to believe in an unseen order which is the source 
of normativity (36–37). Crane accepts James’ general hypothesis, though 
notes a diffi culty with it: everyone, including the scientist, believes in an 
unseen order, whether it be an order of gods or quarks. Crane’s straightfor-
ward admission on this point is admirable, as are his attempts to clarify the 
difference between the transcendent world of science and the transcendent 
world of religion. But I do not think that he succeeds, and his thoughts 
become less and less convincing as the chapter progresses. At points, he 
seems to disassociate religious transcendence from normativity; at others, 
he seems to believe that normativity is the distinguishing mark of religious 
transcendence. Eventually, he attempts to defi ne religious transcendence as 
involving an inherently unknowable element—this would explain, he spec-
ulates, why religious people seem immune to argument (the unknowable 
cannot be refuted). But what does this make of Locke’s substance or Kant’s 
noumenon? What if Nagel is right and we can never know what it is like to 
be a bat?1 Are substances, noumena, and bats religiously transcendent is 
unknowable in some respect? Are Locke, Kant, and Nagel fundamentally 
religious thinkers? Anyways, it is not obvious that all religions espouse this 
1 Nagel, T. 1974. “What is it like to be a bat?” Philosophical Review 4: 435–50.
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sort of transcendence. The ancient Greek and Roman gods, while perhaps 
awe-inspiring and illusive, could nonetheless be interpreted as immanent 
parts of the Greek and Roman worlds—and, moreover, Greek and Roman 
religion was not distinguished from the earthly state by its practitioners. 
And many in the ancient world, regarded philosophy, not religion, as the 
path to communion with ineffable Being.
But this is not the sole problem with the Jamesian thesis: belief in a 
transcendent order which is the source of normativity is not an exclusively 
or even primarily religious idea. In fact, the normativity of nature, in both 
its seen and unseen elements, is at the core of Western philosophy—it is of 
central importance in the work of the Socratics, Cynics, Stoics, and Neo-
platonists. It was a core concept throughout medieval philosophy, and it 
is even accepted by some natural law theorists today. Appeals to nature 
in ethics, fallacious or otherwise, are common enough that have been la-
belled an error of thought—noteworthily, ‘the naturalistic fallacy’ not ‘the 
religious fallacy.’ I wish the book had addressed these issues more fully, to 
better provide the reader with a sense of the meaning of religious morality. 
That said, Crane makes the largely commonsense claim that for the reli-
gious person, harmony with the transcendent order (in the Jamesian sense) 
consists in living in accord with the divine will—though he does not at all 
mention the divine intellect, which would have been far more important 
for many intellectualist mystics, such as Meister Eckhart or Thomas Mer-
ton, or for intellectualist thinkers like Aquinas. Crane says that surely the 
divine will lies at the heart of religion—any person who has thought hard 
about the nature of belief will see this. Fair enough—I am not aware of 
many religions which hold God’s will to be bad, though it should be noted 
that some pagan religions treat the gods as capricious forces to be bribed 
or tamed (perhaps one might label these religions ‘magical’). But, as Crane 
rightly notes, “The diffi culty lies in detailing what this [following God’s will] 
exactly means” (38). That said, Crane does not then expound upon why reli-
gious people think God’s will is to be followed, an omission which has the po-
tential for creating serious misunderstandings. For instance, in the absence 
of further explanation, it might sound as if Crane is suggesting that religion 
fundamentally involves a commitment to voluntarism or divine-command 
theory, which it does not. Numerous religious philosophers have non-am-
biguously taken on the non-voluntarist horn of the Euthyphro dilemma—or 
have attempted to dodge the dilemma altogether. Even non-scholarly reli-
gious people commonly (in my experience) attempt to justify why God thinks 
various things are good—they do not simply say that God’s commands are 
good because God commanded them. One need not be a Leibniz scholar to 
appreciate Voltaire’s scathing critiques (e.g. in Candide) of optimistic, na-
ïve religious explanations of how the slings and arrows of everyday life are 
somehow good and therefore somehow ordained by providence. In short, it 
is plainly false that it is part of the true essence of religion to simplistically 
respect God’s will because it is God’s will. But, even supposing that all re-
ligious people were voluntarists or divine-command theorists of some sort, 
there is no reason to suppose that God’s will would be truly ‘normative’ for 
them in the moral sense. It is perfectly conceivable that one might believe 
in God and regard God’s commands as to be obeyed with fear and trembling, 
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because God is the gunman-writ-infi nite—if one does not obey, one will be 
punished. But fear of punishment need not be taken as a revelation of the 
true, good, or beautiful, as anyone who has seriously refl ected on the mean-
ing of these words will know—and many non-scholars, including religious 
non-scholars, do refl ect on them. Overall, the chapter underemphasizes the 
great diversity of religious thought on normativity.
These objections aside, Crane posits that the ‘religious impulse’ is about 
seeking meaning in life and that the transcendent order provides meaning 
for religious people. Crane then asks, ‘What about those who disbelieve in 
a transcendent order?’ According to the ‘pessimist’ account (which Crane 
espouses), there is no inherent meaning to life, so we might as well learn 
to live without such meaning. According to the ‘optimist’ account, on the 
other hand, one might attempt to explain how, in some way, there can be 
meaning to life without a transcendent order: one might even argue that 
the notion of a transcendent order is completely irrelevant to the question 
of meaning. I found this entire discussion confusing—in fairness, I usually 
struggle to understand the ‘existential’ (if not semantic) meaning of mean-
ing, which people often (incoherently, in my view) use when they discuss the 
meaning of life. That said, I must say that this section of the book did little 
to clarify my confusion. How does God’s will provide existential ‘meaning’ 
for the religious person? Does God say something is meaningful, and it is 
meaningful? This is surely too simplistic an account. It does not account for 
the ‘absurdist’ theist who might fi nd God’s commands arbitrary and mean-
ingless, even if he believes that they must be obeyed for the sake of avoiding 
Hell. Nor does meaning necessarily relate to morality, it seems, since Crane 
thinks we can have morality without a meaning to life—though, it is note-
worthy that Crane also asserts that, as a ‘pessimistic’ atheist, he would fi nd 
morality easier to make sense of if there were a transcendent order. I wish 
Crane would have expanded upon this thought—it would have clarifi ed the 
vaguer points regarding the relationship between the religious impulse and 
normativity. Overall, the meaning of ‘meaning’ was unclear to me; but, in 
fairness, perhaps others will fi nd it more meaningful.
Later in the chapter, Crane states that if religious believers were to 
take certain problems raised by atheists (e.g. ‘If God created the universe, 
who created God?’) more seriously, they ought to be worried. Of course, re-
ligious believers might retort that if Crane took certain problems raised by 
theists (e.g. ‘How does one explain fi ne-tuning?’) more seriously, he ought 
to be worried. Crane is surely aware of such retorts, and he would not be 
unduly self-confi dent if he thought he could convincingly respond to many 
of them in atheism’s favor. What worries me is that he seems to conclude 
that religious sentences uttered by ordinary religious believers are not even 
meant to be cognitive—at least, not in the normal sense presumed by sci-
ence (or common sense), wherein true beliefs are presumed to predict or 
accurately correspond to some state of affairs in the past, present, or future. 
According to Crane, when religious people use sentences such as ‘God cre-
ated the world,’ they are (usually?) using them to express something other 
than a scientifi c belief, because the sentences would obviously be false if 
interpreted scientifi cally. Crane compares religious sentences to historical 
ones—historical claims are true or false, but do not involve simple laws or 
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predictions, like science’s sentences do. But Crane simultaneously uses a 
historical example to point out that religious people are not concerned with 
‘scientifi c’ prediction; Jesus apparently predicted his own return, which did 
not happen, and Crane concludes that religious people must not be worried 
about prediction, since they are not bothered by Jesus’ failed prophecy. But 
in my experience, religious believes are bothered by it; some who become 
aware of the diffi culty go into denial, others become atheists, and yet others 
choose to adopt the traditional Preterist reading of the Bible, wherein Jesus’ 
prophesies were predictive, because they correctly predicted the destruction 
of the Second Temple in 70 A.D. One way or another, it seems unnecessary 
to posit a uniquely ‘religious’ mode of semantics in order to account for the 
data, and the meaning of Crane’s non-scientifi c ‘meaning’ of religious sen-
tences remains vague.
That said, I suspect that many religious people would be confused by 
Crane’s thesis regarding the meaning of their belief; that is, I doubt Crane’s 
thesis holds on a statistical level. The average religious person may not 
have arguments for God’s existence or may not understand that his or her 
arguments for God’s existence are fallacious, and he or she may not be in-
terested (on an average day) in responding to critique, and sometimes his or 
her reticence to consider atheist arguments might be unjustifi ed—but the 
same sort of things go for most people regarding most topics. We all make 
mistakes and we all dislike having these pointed out, because it hurts our 
reputations when we are exposed as wrong, and because we like to think 
that we are reasonably correct about the world and can have confi dence 
that our beliefs are accurate. It is very threatening to be told that one’s core 
beliefs are misguided, both for the common religious person and for the 
sophisticated philosopher. (After all, who genuinely enjoys the peer-review 
process, even if he or she is genuinely committed to the truth?) This does 
not make the essence of religion something vaguely emotive like honking 
for Jesus or cheering ‘Hoorah for the mysteries of faith!’ To be sure, some 
religious people regard expressions like ‘Jesus rose from the dead’ as non-
factual (in the ordinary, historical, or ‘scientifi c’ sense) but as (somehow) 
still meaningful. But many religious people—probably most—do not. In my 
own experience, average religious people tend to believe that the proposi-
tions they express in their religious sentences are true in the ‘scientifi c’ 
sense, and many of them would be greatly bothered by the suggestions that 
these propositions are not factually correct or that they are not factually 
meant. Ironically, the religious ‘non-cognitivist’ is more likely to be the sort 
of sophisticated theologian whom Crane does not wish to discuss in this 
book. If religion is the opiate of the masses, the obscure search for religious 
‘meaning’ in the face of the facts is probably a luxury of the bourgeois. But 
this is a matter of statistical and sociological hypothesis.
Other interesting discussions in the second chapter concern the cogni-
tive science of religion (Crane thinks that contemporary accounts are too 
simplistic), the relationship between science and religion (I fi nd Crane’s ac-
count diffi cult to accept, as may be inferred from the above) and the mean-
ing of faith (it is not dogmatic certainty, but something like a commitment 
to understanding the transcendent mystery of reality in the face of uncer-
tainty).
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In the third chapter, Crane turns to the phenomenon of ‘identifi cation,’ 
which is the second pillar of religion. Crane correctly points out that religions 
are groups of people who function according to the laws of psychology and, and 
are not mere collections. But, as in the section on religious semantics, Crane 
draws distinctions which I do not believe exist. For instance, Crane suggests 
that aspects of religion like fasting and prayer are not explainable as the re-
sults of religious cosmological or moral belief. For, surely, if they were expres-
sions of either of these, they would be expressions of the latter—but morality 
clearly consists in how one treats others. Therefore, fasting and prayer must 
be part of a third, sui-generis category he calls ‘religious practice.’
 This argument is dubious. Recent work in moral psychology2 suggests 
that practices like fasting or prayer may very well be expressions of intrin-
sic, evolutionarily conditioned components of human morality—for instance, 
they may express innate moral tastes for ‘purity’ or ‘respect,’ even if these 
would not be recognized as truly ‘moral’ concerns by Western liberals. And 
simple observation reveals that many religions have prohibitions and taboos 
which have no clear relationship to ‘how we treat others’ in the Western 
liberal sense, but which are still clearly recognized as ‘moral’ injunctions 
by believers. For instance, the Catholic Church treats non-procreative sex 
as gravely immoral—not because non-procreative sex necessarily leads to 
physical, emotional, or societal harm, nor because it necessarily involves 
‘using’ another person or violating another’s autonomy per se, but rather 
because the Church holds that non-procreative sex is ‘unnatural,’ in the Ar-
istotelian sense. In fairness, it has been argued that Christianity borrowed 
this particular taboo from Stoicism, not the Bible or Church tradition3—but, 
borrowed or not, the taboo is still, in some sense, a matter of belief for this 
religious group, and, doubly contrary to Crane’s thesis, it is both a moral and 
cosmologically-based belief, since it only has any plausibility given that the 
universe is understood to function in a certain (i.e. teleological) way. Many 
other examples could be given as to how to reduce ‘religious practice’ to mor-
al and cosmological belief—in fact, it is not clear that in-group identifi cation 
is not regarded as a moral affair by religious communities. People who are 
not Western liberals often regard identifi cation (or ‘loyalty’ and ‘tradition’) 
as a moral concern which pertains to the overall functioning of the universe 
(consider the Indian caste system and its relation to Dharma). It is worth 
remembering that many ancient Christians were persecuted by Romans 
for treason (and ‘atheism’) because they refused to participate in patriotic 
and religious rituals, such as paying homage to Caesar or the gods, because 
patriotism, religion, and loyalty were regarded as the same thing by many 
ancient peoples. (Consider that Imperial Rome’s ‘offi cial’ founding fi gure was 
‘Pius Aeneas.’). To this day, many non-religious citizens (including atheists) 
fi nd it distasteful to burn national fl ags or to refuse to rise during national 
anthems—whether Western liberals acknowledge loyalty or tradition to be a 
2 See, for instance, Graham, J., Haidt, J., and Nosek, B. A. 2009. “Liberals and 
Conservatives Rely on Different Sets of Moral Foundations.” Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology 96 (5): 1029–1046.
3 See Noonan Jr, J. T., and Noonan, J. T. 2012. Contraception: A History of 
Its treatment by the Catholic Theologians and Canonists. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press.
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truly ‘moral’ affair or not. In sum, Crane’s ground for positing the category of 
sui generis ‘religious practice’ is weak—religious taboos and traditions can 
probably be accounted for in moral and cosmological terms.
Crane also discusses the meanings of patriotism, pride, and shame, and 
briefl y discusses identifi cation in the context of Rawls. He argues that the 
sort of religious upbringing which the New Atheists call child indoctrination 
is more akin to the sort of cultural adjustment one receives in the family, 
and he is surely correct on this. Further on, he explains that the sorts of 
meaningful practices, traditions, and histories which lend meaning to reli-
gion also lend meaning to secular pursuits like academia—and again, he is 
surely correct. Crane completes the chapter with a discussion of Durkheim’s 
notion of the Sacred, with Sacred things symbolically uniting the religious 
impulse with the phenomenon of identifi cation through their intentionality. 
Skeptics of Durkheim will be reticent, but it is hard to see how Crane’s basic 
point could be inaccurate. 
The fourth chapter covers the topic of religious violence, and Crane’s 
main points are very plausible. Crane notes that many supposedly religious 
confl icts have cultural, ethnic, and political undertones such that it is dif-
fi cult to account for them simply in terms of doctrinal differences; that is, 
while differences in cosmological or moral beliefs can make a difference, the 
element of identifi cation and the numerous other factors which generally 
fuel human confl ict are probably more important. Crane understates the 
roles which particular beliefs do have in causing confl ict (the fi lioque clause 
really did lead to schism), but the main point of the chapter (that religious 
confl icts are human confl icts) is well taken; Crane has done a great service 
in highlighting it.
If the fi rst chapter began with a large question (‘What is religion?’), the 
last chapter begins with an even larger assertion: that religion is one of “the 
main drivers behind world events are religion and nationhood.” That said, 
one must learn to live with religion, because it is “wishful thinking” to sup-
pose that religion will go away (163). To my mind, the diffi culty with these 
assertions is that the overall secularization of many European countries 
seems to clearly contradict it. Though large percentages of the population 
do remain nominally religious in even the most atheistic European coun-
tries (e.g. France and the Czech Republic), there is little denying that reli-
gion (as defi ned by Crane) has become less important in everyday life. With 
a fair amount of data available regarding these matters I wish Crane could 
have argued for his claims more empirically.
The remainder of the fi nal chapter discusses the meaning of tolerance. 
Being tolerant is not relativistic or paternalistic, nor does it imply respect 
for the beliefs one merely tolerates. By defi nition, toleration implies disap-
proval—one could not tolerate religious beliefs if one liked them or thought 
that they were true. The most interesting, though also most underdevel-
oped, section of this chapter is about the limits of tolerance. At a political 
level, Crane believes that we should not tolerate religious behavior beyond 
the rule of law, though what constitutes a reasonable boundary between 
law and religious liberty remains vague. This, to me, would have been a fas-
cinating section to have more fully fl eshed out. Crane spends most of the re-
mainder of the section addressing how, on a personal level, an atheist ought 
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to treat legal religious behavior. ‘It depends on the circumstances,’ seems to 
be the answer. Sometimes, it may be morally commendable to even partici-
pate in religious rituals, out of respect for one’s religious neighbors—for in-
stance, by agreeing to wear a skull-cap at a Jewish friend’s funeral. In other 
cases, one might rightly protest offensive (but legal) religious behaviors, 
such as the prohibition of women from the priesthood in some churches. But 
one should not argue against objectionable practices with philosophical or 
scientifi c arguments—these are unlikely to have an impact, since religious 
folk are not generally receptive to truth, even if many are reasonable and 
highly educated. Tolerant dialogue, which involves understanding what 
religion is about (an attempt to fi nd meaning through identifi cation with 
some group which talks about the transcendent), is preferable. That said, I 
did not fi nd a recommendation as to how dialogue might persuade religious 
people to avoid offensive or immoral practices, given that philosophical or 
scientifi c arguments are off the table.
In summary, the diffi culties of Crane’s book lie not in its content, but in 
the ways in which it could have been more fully expanded in order to uphold 
his main criticism of the New Atheists. Crane has made fascinating psy-
chological and sociological claims regarding religion—that religion will not 
go away, that religious people are unreceptive to rational arguments, that 
this is because of group identifi cation and belief in an unknowable tran-
scendent order. But Crane does not convincingly argue for why it is solely 
religious people who have their access to reason blocked through peculiar 
beliefs or in-group identifi cation. As Crane acknowledges, there are many 
forms of belief and many forms of in-group identifi cation—why is religion so 
special? Why have so many rational, non-religious (in Crane’s sense of the 
term) thinkers in the philosophical tradition—Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, 
Plotinus—held beliefs in a transcendent, normative order, if such beliefs 
are inherently ‘religious’? Is Aristotle’s ‘theology’ just so much non-cognitive 
expression of in-group identifi cation? On a more scientifi c note, Crane does 
not always back up his suggestions up with empirical data, which is prob-
lematic considering that common-sense and historical intuition contradict 
them. For instance, Crane largely ignores the fact that religious people do 
occasionally (I do not know how often—that is a statistical question) change 
their minds in the course of argument—this is often how atheists are made 
(and vice versa). Nor does Crane pay attention to the fact that some religious 
people genuinely do regard religion as a series of cosmological and ethical 
beliefs, such as the theologians whom Crane straightforwardly admits he 
will not discuss in the book. Overall, Crane’s view of ordinary religious folk 
comes across as insuffi ciently empirical and rather pessimistic—while the 
New Atheists at least credit religious people with the ability to change their 
false beliefs, Crane denies that the average religious person  is interested in 
truth. Whether accurate or not, the claim is empirical and requires empiri-
cal support. These issues aside, Crane’s book provides food for thought, and 
creates plenty of ground for future research.4
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